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RULE 3.190(c)(4) MOTIONS-A FALL FROM GRACE
JAMES T. MILLER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The original justification for a motion under Rule 3.190(c)(4),
Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, ("(c)(4)" motion),' was pru-
dently simple-to permit a pretrial determination of whether the
state could establish a prima facie case based on undisputed fact.2
The drafters of the Criminal Rules intended the (c)(4) motion to
be the functional equivalent of the civil motion for summary judg-
ment.3 The operative principle of these motions is to conserve judi-
cial resources; if the facts are not in dispute (i.e., if the trier of fact
need not weigh the evidence nor determine its credibility), the trial
judge can decide whether the state can prove a prima facie case.
A (c)(4) motion is a potentially resourceful tool used by trial
judges to expedite cases. Although the judiciary usually embraces
devices to reduce caseloads, Florida courts have resolutely rejected
an expansive use of (c)(4) motions.' In 82% of the cases reviewed
for this Article, appellate courts reversed decisions which granted
(c)(4) motions.5 This is a significantly high number of reversals.
Appellate courts generally apply a "presumption of correctness" to
the decisions of trial courts. This means that any reversible error
must be affirmatively shown upon the record by the party seeking
to overturn the lower court's decision.' A trial court's granting of a
(c)(4) motion, on the other hand, does not automatically receive
this presumption of correctness; the reviewing courts instead seem
* Assistant Public Defender, Jacksonville, Florida. University of Florida, B.A. 1976; J.D.
1979.
1. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.190(c)(4) provides the criminal law counterpart to the civil sum-
mary judgment procedure. Under this rule, an accused may successfully move for a dismis-
sal if there are "no material disputed facts and the undisputed facts do not establish a
prima facie case of guilt against the defendant." See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
2. State v. Davis, 243 So. 2d 587, 590 (Fla. 1971) (quoting FLA. R. CRAIM. P. 1.190(c)(4)
committee note (1967)). The former Fla. R. Crim. P. 1.190(c)(4), 196 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 1967)
(per curiam), is currently codified at FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.190(c)(4).
3. Id.
4. Panels of each of the five district courts of appeal have expressed concern over the
unrestricted use of (c)(4) motions. See, e.g., State v. Patlon, 443 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 2d DCA
1983); State v. Stewart, 404 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); State v. Home, 399 So. 2d 49
(Fla. 3d DCA 1981); State v. Huggins, 368 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); and State v.
Giesy, 243 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971).
5. Of the 170 cases reviewed for this Article, appellate courts reversed 140 decisions
where the trial courts granted (c)(4) motions.
6. E.g., O'Steen v. State, 111 So. 725, 728 (Fla. 1927).
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to seek out any flaws in the process.
In State v. Moore,8 however, the Fourth District Court of Appeal
upheld the granting of a (c)(4) motion based upon the presumption
of correctness. In a per curiam decision, the court acknowledged
that the trial court must resolve all inferences against the accused
and view the evidence in a light most favorable to the state. The
court noted:
It is to be presumed that the trial court indulged inferences in
that manner .... [W]hile we might have permitted the case to
go to the jury were that decision ours initially to make, that de-
termination in the present posture of the case would constitute
usurpation of the function of the trial court.9
The Moore case appears to be an anomaly despite the manifest
applicability of the presumption of correctness to cases undergoing
appellate review.10 This Article reviews the reasons for antipathy
towards (c)(4) motions and the historical development of the pur-
poses and rules of construction and procedure attending (c)(4)
motions.
II. PURPOSES OF A (c)(4) MOTION
The creators of the (c)(4) motion intended it to be a new remedy
for criminal defendants.' 1 Prior to the enactment of Rule
1.190(c)(4), the predecessor to Rule 3.190(c)(4), a defendant could
move to dismiss an information only on the grounds of improper
form or by raising certain specific defenses to prosecution. 2 The
Florida Supreme Court first discussed the objectives of the rule in
State v. Davis." Circuit Judge Ben C. Willis, sitting by designation
and writing for a unanimous court, noted that the procedure
"would permit "a pre-trial determination of the law of the case
when the facts . . . are not in dispute.' 4 The Davis court further
7. See supra note 4.
8. 425 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 4th DCA), petition for review denied, 434 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 1983).
9. Id.
10. O'Steen v. State, 111 So. 725 (Fla. 1927); see also Boone v. State, 183 So. 2d 869 (Fla.
1st DCA 1966); Wilson v. State, 164 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964).
11. See supra note 2.
12. State v. Davis, 243 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1971); see also, Williamson v. Baker, 4 So. 2d 471
(Fla. 1941) (en banc) (defendant could file motion to quash the information because of de-
fects upon its face); State v. Mach, 187 So. 2d 918, 922 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966) (a court consid-
ering a motion to quash an information will not consider sufficiency of the evidence).




[Tihis procedure is not a precise counterpart to the summary
judgment procedures afforded by the Rules of Civil Proce-
dure .... However, there is at least one common objective in the
two procedures, namely, to avoid a trial when all the material
facts are not genuinely in issue and could legally support only one
judgment.' 5
A dismissal under a (c)(4) motion, unlike summary judgment, is
not a bar to subsequent prosecution."6
The initial justification for (c)(4) motions was to save time and
money and avoid unnecessary trials. For example, as the Second
District stated in State v. Davis,1 7 "one could hardly conjure a
more ideal set of circumstances for its utilization. . . . [A] trial on
the counts dismissed would have been fruitless and an unnecessary
expense to the public."18 However, other courts soon began to limit
the scope of (c)(4) motions. The Fourth District Court of Appeal,
in State v. Giesy,19 explained that the motion "[was] not intended
to be a trial by affidavit, nor a dry run of a trial on the merits.
Neither [was] it intended as some type of 'fishing expedition' to
force the prosecution to come forward with enough evidence to es-
tablish a prima facie case. .. ."20 These limitations stem from the
case law developed in summary judgment proceedings in civil
cases.2" Some courts have stated that a trial judge should rarely
grant a (c)(4) motion because there are factual disputes in most
cases.2 2 In State v. West,23 the Fourth District stated that a trial
court should approach any summary judgment proceeding with
caution. In expressing antipathy towards the (c)(4) motion, courts
have said that the motion is not a substitute for trial,2 4 or a mini-
15. Id.
16. See id.
17. 234 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970).
18. Id. at 714-15.
19. 243 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971).
20. Id. at 636.
21. See, e.g., Manucy v. Manucy, 362 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Unijax, Inc. v.
Factory Ins. Assn., 328 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 341 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 1976);
Weinstein v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Co., 141 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 1st DCA
1962).
22. State v. Hunwick, 446 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); State v. Carroll, 404 So. 2d
844 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
23. 262 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972).
24. State v. Stewart, 404 So. 2d 185, 186 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
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trial on the merits,2" or a "battle of affidavits.
26
The granting of (c)(4) motions which were obviously not in com-
pliance with the criminal rules soon frustrated appellate courts.
For instance, in State v. Horne,27 the trial court committed "egre-
gious error" by dismissing charges of armed robbery and bur-
glary.28 The state filed a traverse which unquestionably placed ma-
terial facts in dispute. The Third District reversed the dismissal
and stated that "[w]hile it is indeed regrettable that it is appropri-
ate so to characterize the rulings below, they may thus be regarded
only as embodying inexplicable and totally unjustified failures or
refusals to follow the law."2 9 The Third District later stated in
State v. Terrell3:
We had thought that our countless recent reversals of orders
granting "(c)(4)" motions would have impressed-upon trial
counsel and trial courts alike-the very limited extent to which
these motions are appropriate. Apparently that view was much
too sanguine. Therefore we are once again required to and do re-
verse the order under review ... "
The Terrell court also admonished appellate counsel to recognize
the requirements of the case law and to candidly confess error
when appropriate. This author has found only two reported exam-
ples of confessed error by defendant's counsel.3 2
Recent decisions have continued to limit the scope of (c)(4) mo-
tions. In State v. Hunwick,3 3 the Fourth District stated that a trial
judge should rarely grant a (c)(4) motion. 4 The Hunwick court
then suggested that a "defendant is protected [from the denial of
the motion] in that if the state's case is insufficient at trial, the
defendant may obtain a directed verdict of acquittal, or the jury
will find [him] not guilty."3 5 Some courts have developed the the-
ory that a (c)(4) motion should not prevent the state from having
25. State v. Wood, 299 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974).
26. Wale v. State, 397 So. 2d 738, 740 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
27. 399 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
28. Id. at 50.
-29. Id.
30. 406 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (footnote omitted).
31. Id. at 1215.
32. State v. Love, 415 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); State v. Williams, 410 So. 2d 1380
(Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
33. 446 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).
34. Id. at 215.
35. Id.
MOTION TO DISMISS
its day in court." In State v. Farrugia37, the First District opined,
"[i]t is not the purpose of Rule 3.190(c)(4) to preclude prosecution
and consideration by the jury of factual inferences bearing on the
ultimate guilt or innocence of the accused."38 The Fifth District
has developed the rule that if the state produces the "barest bit"
of evidence of a prima facie case, the trial court should deny a
(c)(4) motion." That court, in State v. Pentecost, further ruled
that this "bare evidence" standard is appropriate because if the
prosecution is allowed to proceed and it is discovered that the ac-
cused is entitled to either a directed verdict at trial or an acquittal,
"each party has been given its due."' 40
Although the early cases indicated that the purpose of a (c)(4)
motion was to avoid costly and unnecessary trials, recent cases
state the purpose of these motions in terms of why a trial court
should not grant the motion. The animosity towards the granting
of (c)(4) motions is probably derived from instances when the trial
courts have improvidently taken factual issues away from the jury,
such as: (1) when the facts were in dispute; (2) when the trial court
erroneously believed that the state, as a matter of law, failed to
establish a prima facie case; or (3) when the issues of the case
were, for policy reasons, questions for a jury and not for a judge."1
The appellate courts appear to be sending trial courts a message,
reaffirming that except in certain rare instances, the jury should
decide the factual and attendant legal matters of a case.
III. RULES OF PROCEDURE AND CONSTRUCTION
The rules of procedure and construction developed by appellate
courts reflect their reluctance to uphold the granting of (c)(4) mo-
tions. Rules 3.190(c)(4) and (d) outline the basic procedures for the
accused and the state.'2 Rule 3.190(c)(4) provides that a motion to
dismiss is proper where:
36. E.g., State v. Pentecost, 397 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
37. 419 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
38. Id. at 1120.
39. Pentecost, 397 So. 2d at 712.
40. Id. at 712.
41. Certain issues appear by definition to be jury questions. See, e.g., State v. Martinez,
422 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (whether a gun is concealed from ordinary sight); State
v. Sheppard, 401 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (recklessness); State v. Hudson, 397 So. 2d
426 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981) (consent in a sexual battery). All require an ad hoc determination of
what is reasonable and appropriate, judged by community customs, in a certain set of
circumstances.
42. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.190(c)(4), (d).
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[tihere are no material disputed facts and the undisputed facts do
not establish a prima facie case of guilt against the defendant.
The facts on which such motion is based should be specifically
alleged and the motion sworn to.
Rule 3.190(d) provides:
The State may traverse or demur to a motion to dismiss which
alleges factual matters. Factual matters alleged in a motion to
dismiss shall be deemed admitted unless specifically denied by
the state in such traverse. The court may receive evidence on any
issue of fact necessary to the decision on the motion. A motion to
dismiss under paragraph (c)(4) of this rule shall be denied if the
State files a traverse which with specificity denies under oath the
material fact or facts alleged in the motion to dismiss. Such de-
murrer or traverse shall be filed a reasonable time before the
hearing on the motion to dismiss.
The accused must strictly comply with the provisions of Rule
3.190(c)(4). In support of its holding in State v. Maycock43 , the
Third District said that the "procedure set out in [a (c)(4) motion]
is a distinct remedy and in order to avoid results which are not
supported by the record, the rule must be followed in particular-
ity."' 44 Whenever the accused has failed to follow specifically each
of the provisions of Rule 3.190(c)(4), district courts of appeal have
not hesitated to summarily reverse a granting of the motion.46 Sev-
eral decisions have held, however, that the state waived objections
to noncompliance with the rules by not raising this issue in the
trial court."' This waiver doctrine applies equally to the accused.4
For example, Rule 3.190(d) unequivocally requires a written trav-
43. 361 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
44. Id. at 219.
45. See, e.g., State v. Gower, 422 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (defendant did not
swear to motion), petition for review denied, 430 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1983); State v. Terrell, 406
So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (did not establish how facts failed to show a prima facie
case); State v. Pena-Salazar, 405 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (a legally insufficient (c)(4)
motion should be summarily denied without regard to the state's traverse or demurrer);
State v. Huggins, 368 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (motion not sworn to; did not allege
that the material facts were undisputed and did not demonstrate a lack of a prima facie
case); State v. Church, 353 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (no specific allegations of material
fact).
46. State v. Martin, 422 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); State v. Mayle, 406 So. 2d 108
(Fla. 5th DCA 1981); petition for review denied, 419 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1982); State v. Kemp,
305 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974).
47. State v. Upton, 392 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); State v. Cramer, 383 So. 2d 254
(Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
MOTION TO DISMISS
erse. In State v. Upton, the court ruled an oral traverse permissi-
ble because the defendant did not object to it.48 Some courts have
reversed dismissals pursuant to (c)(4) motions because of noncom-
pliance with the rule even though the state did not object at the
trial level. 49
The First District Court of Appeal first discussed the respective
burdens of proof for the accused and the state in Ellis v. State.0
According to the court, the burden of going forward is with the
accused and he must (1) allege under oath, that the material facts
are undisputed; (2) describe what the material facts are; and (3)
demonstrate that the undisputed facts fail to establish a prima fa-
cie case or establish a valid defense. 1 In Ritter v. State, 2 the Fifth
District explained this burden: "As a procedural matter on a mo-
tion under this rule, the accused must verify facts so inconsistent
with his guilt that if untraversed their resulting acceptance as
truth will establish his innocence." 3 The Ritter court also noted
that the types of facts necessary to a (c)(4) motion are facts that
establish the "classic" affirmative defenses such as self-defense, in-
sanity, or entrapment. The motion could also relate to any facts
which are mutually exclusive to those facts essential to the state's
case, such as alibi or the defendant's possessory right to property
allegedly stolen. The facts may also show an exception as defined
in the statutory definition of an offense. 4 If the accused fails to
fulfill these requirements, the trial judge must automatically deny
the motion. 6
The defendant's motion must specifically list the material undis-
puted facts. An allegation that the "undisputed facts do not estab-
lish a prima facie case of guilt" is insufficient.51 One court criti-
cized the drafting of a motion because of the ambiguity and
evasiveness of the fact statement. 7 Facts that constitute implied
inferences or suppositions are not sufficient.6 8 For example, in
48. 392 So. 2d at 1013.
49. See supra note 41.
50. 346 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 352 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 1977).
51. Id. at 1045.
52. 390 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
53. Id. at 169.
54. Id. at 169-70.
55. State v. Pena-Salazar, 405 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
56. State v. Holder, 400 So. 2d 162, 164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
57. State v. Lawler, 384 So. 2d 1290 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
58. State v. Graney, 380 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
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State v. Green,5 9 the trial court dismissed a charge of resisting ar-
rest with violence. The defendant alleged he "wiggled and strug-
gled" with the officers attempting to arrest him. 0 The state did
not traverse the motion. The Green court stated that "[t]he ambi-
guity of this description prevents a determination [of whether de-
fendant's] resistance was or was not, as a matter of law, with vio-
lence." 61 If the facts are ambiguous and susceptible to multiple
meanings, then a trial court should deny a (c)(4) motion because
the facts, on their face, present a jury question. As the Second Dis-
trict stated in State v. Patlon,62 "[e]ven where the facts are undis-
puted, they may be subject to differing interpretations.""'
The courts have disapproved of substituting deposition testi-
mony for specific allegations in a motion." Although it is proper to
attach a deposition to a motion and incorporate it by reference,
deposition testimony is not a substitute for allegations in the mo-
tion.6 Deposition testimony may also create inconsistencies and is-
sues of credibility that are manifestly jury questions." Some courts
have given similar treatment to references to arrest reports. An ar-
rest report can support specific facts in the motion, but it is not a
substitute for such allegations. 7
The accused must specifically demonstrate how the undisputed
material facts do not establish a prima facie case or establish a
valid defense. An assertion, without more, that the undisputed
facts do not establish a prima facie case is legally insufficient. 8
Conclusory statements of law masked as statements of fact are also
insufficient. 9 In Kassel v. State'7 0 the defendant filed a (c)(4) mo-
tion to dismiss a charge of possession of a controlled substance.
She alleged that she legally possessed the drug. The Kassel court
stated that it found "fault in compliance with the rule on both
59. 400 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
60. Id. at 1323.
61. Id. (footnote omitted).
62. 443 So. 2d at 346 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
63. Id. at 348.
64. E.g., State v. McIntyre, 303 So. 2d 675, 676 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974).
65. Id.
66. See State v. Power, 369 So. 2d 96, 96 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
67. State v. Martinez, 422 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); see also State v. Torres, 375
So. 2d 889 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); State v. DeJerinett, 283 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert.
denied, 287 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1973).
68. State v. Holder, 400 So. 2d 162, 164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); State v. Butler, 325 So. 2d
55 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976).
69. See State v. Sedlmayer, 375 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
70. 382 So. 2d 1354 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
MOTION TO DISMISS
sides in that both the motion and traverse were conclusory in na-
ture and not factually explicit."71 In a case involving the charge of
false imprisonment, the court disapproved of the statement that
"the defendant did not "touch [or] make any threatening gestures
or remarks, '72 because this allegation was a legal conclusion and
not a statement of fact. A (c)(4) motion based on a statutory ex-
emption must illustrate how the facts unequivocally fall within the
exception. 3 It follows logically that if the defendant relies upon an
affirmative defense, he must then demonstrate how the undisputed
facts comprise all elements of that defense. 4 If any element of a
defense is missing or the facts constituting an affirmative defense
are ambiguous, then the trial court must deny the motion.7 5
Another issue of the legal sufficiency of a (c)(4) motion is
whether the defendant's attorney can swear to the motion. Rule
3.190(c)(4) merely provides that "the motion [be] sworn to." Every
court that has addressed this issue has held that the defendant,
and not his attorney, must swear to the motione.7  The accused
must swear to the motion because the attorney does not have per-
sonal knowledge of the facts. 7 A defendant must also swear to the
motion because "by taking the oath, [he] thus subjects himself to
the penalties of perjury if his recitation of 'undisputed facts' is
false. ' 78 A declaration that the facts are true and correct to the
best of the defendant's knowledge and belief is insufficient. 79 This
rule probably exists to discourage perjury and to prevent a defen-
dant's attorney from stating certain facts within a (c)(4) motion
when his client will testify to other facts at trial.
Although Rule 3.190(d) requires a sworn traverse, the state at-
torney need not have personal knowledge of the facts.8 ° The
Fourth District expressed this view in State v. Moore,81 and stated
that "[w]e see a distinction between a defendant's oath and that of
an assistant state attorney who can traverse only in good faith on
71. Id. at 1355.
72. State v. Horton, 442 So. 2d 408, 409 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
73. State v. Miller, 413 So. 2d 1295 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).
74. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 400 So. 2d 1326 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
75. See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., State v. Moore, 423 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); State v. Bethea, 409
So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); State v. Holder, 400 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); State
v. Upton, 392 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
77. Holder, 400 So. 2d at 162.
78. Upton, 392 So. 2d at 1016.
79. Moore, 423 So. 2d at 1011.
80. State v. Hamlin, 306 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).
81. 423 So. 2d at 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
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the basis of the contents of his file, not what he knows of his own
knowledge." 82 One court optimistically said that a state attorney is
a public official who takes an oath of office, an attorney at law and
an officer of the court who would not demean his office and ignore
his obligation by filing spurious and bad faith traverses.8 3 In order
for a traverse by the state to be effective, it must constitute a good
faith dispute of the material facts, and it should not be based on
speculation, conjecture, presumption, or assumption.8 '
Rule 3.190(d) provides that factual matters alleged in a motion
to dismiss shall be deemed admitted unless specifically denied by
the state in its traverse. A traverse which does not specifically deny
all the material facts in the motion to dismiss is legally insuffi-
cient.8 A pleading of "lack of knowledge" of a fact in a traverse is
not a denial of that fact.' The First District's decision in Ellis v.
State is a rare example of a court's discussing the exact require-
ments of a traverse.8 7 In Ellis, the state merely denied that the
undisputed facts did not establish a prima facie case. Judge Boyer
noted that Rule 3.190(c)(4) is silent as to whether the state, in its
traverse, must list those material facts, either disputed or undis-
puted, upon which it will rely at the hearing on the motion and
which were not contained in the defendant's motion.8 The better
practice, according to the Ellis court,
would be for all such factual matters to be contained or alluded to
in the State's traverse and that the State should not be permitted
(absent an amendment to the traverse) to present evidence at the
hearing on the motion to dismiss concerning facts which were not
contained or alluded to within the motion to traverse. .... 89
If the state simply avers in the traverse that "it specifically denies
the facts," then the possibility of such denials merely to prevent
consideration of the motion is potentially significant. The position
that the state satisfies the requirements of denying with specificity
by stating that "it specifically denies" is a tautological argument
contrary to the provisions and intent of Rules 3.190(c)(4) and (d).
82. Id. at 1011.
83. Hamlin, 306 So. 2d at 152.
84. Ellis v. State, 346 So. 2d 1044, 1045-46 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
85. State v. Kemp, 305 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975).
86. Patlon, 443 So. 2d at 348.
87. 346 So. 2d at 1044.
88. Id. at 1046.
89. Id.
MOTION TO DISMISS
There are abundant examples of traverses which specifically deny
and deal directly with the facts in the motion to dismiss.90 These
cases illustrate the efficacy of specific traverses; such traverses fa-
cilitate meaningful review by both the trial and appellate courts.
Rule 3.190(d) requires a written traverse. The state must file
within a "reasonable time" before the hearing on the motion to
dismiss. Although all courts have adhered to the written traverse
requirement, some courts have upheld oral traverses if the defen-
dant did not object at the trial level." In State v. Burnison,92 the
Second District considered the timeliness of a traverse filed mo-
ments before the hearing on the motion. 3 The defendant objected
to the traverse as untimely. The trial judge disregarded the trav-
erse because of the late filing and granted the motion to dismiss.
The Burnison court stated that the language of Rule 3.190(d) im-
plied a flexible definition of "a reasonable time." 9' The comment
to Rules 3.190(d) and 3.060 (time for service of motions) suggest
that judgment and common sense should control application of the
rules. Although the court stated it could not condone the state's
action, the violation was not a willful and substantial violation of
the rule. In addition, the trial court could have ordered a continu-
ance and the defendant did not demonstrate any undue prejudice
because of the tardy filing of the traverse."
In addition to the requirements for the accused and the state,
appellate courts have developed a set of rules of procedure and
construction for trial judges. The determinative issue in a (c)(4)
motion is whether the state can establish a prima facie case. The
First District, in State v. Snowden,96 said that "it [is] sufficient if
prima facie proof of the corpus delicti is made. Corpus delicti is a
latin phrase generally meaning 'the body of the crime' and . . . is
generally used in legal writings to mean the elements legally neces-
sary to show that a crime has been committed."97 Proof for a mo-
tion to dismiss is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt but some
proof that tends to show the commission of a crime. The courts
have explicitly defined prima facie as "any evidence" upon which a
90. See, e.g., Patlon, 443 So. 2d at 346; Horton, 442 So. 2d at 408; Holder, 400 So. 2d at
162; see also State v. Rogers, 386 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
91. See Pentecost, 397 So. 2d at 712.
92. 438 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
93. Id. at 539.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 345 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (footnote omitted).
97. Id. at 858.
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jury of reasonable persons could find guilt.98 The Fifth District has
developed the "barest bit of a prima facie case" standard. 9 "It is
only when the state cannot establish even the barest bit of a prima
facie case that it should be prevented from prosecuting. '"100
The cardinal rule of construction is that the trial court must
construe the facts in a light most favorable to the state.' 0 ' A trial
court should grant a (c)(4) motion only if the most favorable con-
struction of the facts would not establish a prima facie case of
guilt.'02 "[I]n determining whether the State has shown a prima
facie case so as to successfully resist a '(c)(4)' Motion, all infer-
ences are resolved against the defendant.' '0 3
The second most important rule of construction is that the trial
judge cannot weigh the evidence or determine credibility.' 4 For
example, in several cases where witnesses recanted or changed
their testimony, trial judges granted motions to dismiss because of
the inherent inconsistencies in the testimony.'0 5 These cases were
subsequently reversed on appeal because a prior inconsistent state-
ment is not a matter for resolution on a (c)(4) motion.'0 6 Also, a
trial judge cannot weigh the testimony supporting a (c)(4) motion,
that is, the judge cannot decide whether one witness' testimony is
more credible than that of another witness, nor can he determine
that a witness' testimony rebuts other testimony to the extent that
the state cannot establish a prima facie case.
Rule 3.190(d) states that if the state traverses the motion, then
the trial judge must automatically deny the motion. In spite of this
unequivocal directive, several cases demonstrate that some trial
judges still consider whether the state has established a prima facie
case notwithstanding the traverse.'10 If any material facts are in
98. See, e.g., State v. McQuay, 403 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); State v. Hires, 372 So.
2d 183 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); State v. DeJerinett, 283 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied,
287 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1973).
99. See Pentecost, 397 So. 2d at 712.
100. Id.
101. Moore, 425 So. 2d at 1173; State v. McQuay, 403 So. 2d 566, 567 (Fla. 3d DCA
1981).
102. State v. Sedlmayer, 375 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); State v. Smith, 348 So. 2d
637 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
103. State v. Pettis, 397 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (citations omitted).
104. State v. Alexander, 406 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); State v. Fort, 380 So. 2d
534 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); State v. Bryant, 373 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
105. See, e.g., State v. Moore, 424 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), afi'd, 452 So. 2d 559
(Fla. 1984); State v. Fetherolf, 388 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); State v. Sanders, 380 So.
2d 1126 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
106. Fetherolf, 388 So. 2d at 38.
107. State v. Stewart, 404 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Wale v. State, 397 So. 2d 738
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dispute, the trial judge cannot excise those facts and determine
whether a prima facie case exists;10 8 instead, the judge must deny
the motion and present the case to the trier of fact.
Although the rule and case law have not defined the word "ma-
terial," a material fact should be a fact which tends to prove an
essential element of the state's case or establishes an element of an
affirmative defense. Several motions to dismiss and traverses in re-
ported decisions have contained immaterial or superfluous facts. 109
In some cases, the dismissal was improper because the facts stated
in the motion to dismiss were immaterial to the state's case. 110 To
date, however, the district courts of appeal and the supreme court
have not stricken traverses or demurrers because they denied or
added immaterial facts. The requirement of material facts in (c)(4)
motions, traverses, and demurrers is another compelling reason to
require specific delineations in a traverse or demurrer. A reviewing
court cannot always adequately determine the materiality of a fact
without a specific motion to dismiss, traverse, or demurrer.
Rule 3.190(d) states that a court may receive evidence on any
issue of fact necessary to the decision on the motion."" This is a
curious section; unless the facts presented are not in dispute, the
trial judge must still deny the motion to dismiss. Parties can stipu-
late to additional facts presented at the hearing, 12 but either party
can refuse to accept a stipulation.1 If either side wishes to present
additional evidence at the hearing, the question arises as to why
the parties did not include these facts in their pleadings. The Sec-
ond District has held that a trial judge need not limit his inquiry
to the "four corners of the charging instrument but may also con-
sider the allegations presented by the motion."" 4 The trial court
cannot, however, go outside the record before it to make a decision
on the motion.'" This position implies the use of a hearing to de-
termine whether the facts are actually in dispute or to clarify am-
biguous or misleading facts contained in the motion or a traverse.
If a trial judge goes beyond the facts and allegations in the mo-
(Fla. 4th DCA 1981); State v. Wood, 299 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974).
108. State v. Alvarez, 403 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).
109. State v. Carroll, 404 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); State v. Holder, 400 So. 2d 162
(Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
110. Fetherolf, 388 So. 2d at 38.
111. FLA. R. CriM. P. 3.190(d).
112. State v. Church, 353 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
113. Id.
114. State v. Bower, 341 So. 2d 216, 217 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976).
115. State v. Clark, 301 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974).
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tions, traverses, or demurrers, the proceeding will become the
"mini-trial on the merits" which is so loathed by the appellate
courts.
Demurrers have presented few problems to appellate judges. The
effect of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency of the defen-
dant's motion."" The state, by demurrer, can challenge the form of
the motion (i.e., the motion is not sworn to, fails to specifically list
material facts, or fails to allege how the facts do not establish a
prima facie case), or it may challenge the legal effect of the facts.
In some cases, the state will agree that the facts are not in dispute
but will disagree that those facts do not establish a prima facie
case. Instances such as this produce the most common use of the
demurrer. 17
These rules of procedure and construction have led courts to
routinely deny (c)(4) motions in certain situations. Circumstantial
evidence cases have presented special problems of interpretation
for reviewing courts. If the state's case is entirely circumstantial,
the state's evidence at trial must exclude every reasonable hypoth-
esis of innocence." 8 Most courts have decided that the trial judge
should not determine this matter in a (c)(4) motion, even though
he doubts the sufficiency of the state's evidence." 9 Indeed, several
courts, after reversing the granting of a (c)(4) motion, have can-
didly admitted that they doubted whether the state's evidence
could rebut all reasonable hypotheses at trial."10
This rule of construction potentially creates a significant waste
of judicial resources. At trial on a motion for judgment of acquit-
tal, the trial judge will view the evidence in a light most favorable
to the state and decide whether it rebuts all reasonable hypotheses
of innocence.' 2 ' In a (c)(4) motion where the facts are not in dis-
pute, the trial judge can easily make the same determination; he
will view the undisputed evidence in a light most favorable to the
state (including resolving all inferences against the defendant), and
determine whether the facts negate all reasonable hypotheses of
0
116. State v. Rodriguez, 402 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
117. State v. Murray, 425 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); State v. Miller, 413 So. 2d 1295
(Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Powell v. State, 369 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
118. See, e.g., Mayo v. State, 71 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1954); Woods v. State, 426 So. 2d 69
(Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Tillman v. State, 353 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
119. E.g., State v. Fry, 422 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); State v. Craig, 413 So. 2d 863
(Fla. 1st DCA 1982); State v. Upton, 392 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
120. State v. Hunwick, 446 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); State v. Savarino, 381 So. 2d
734 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); State v. Smith, 348 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
121. Clark, 301 So. 2d at 492.
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innocence. Several courts have done just that. In State v. Hayes,122
the state presented a circumstantial case, based solely on finger-
print evidence of burglary to a residence. The Fourth District up-
held the granting of the motion to dismiss because it found at least
five reasonable hypotheses of innocence to explain the presence of
the fingerprints.123 In Mobley v. State,'21 the Fourth District
reached a similar result and in a case substantially similar to
Hayes and Mobley, the First District decided that the trial judge
should not decide a circumstantial case on a (c)(4) motion. 2 5
The First District had previously decided another circumstantial
case in a (c)(4) motion. In Ellis v. State, the state attempted to
prove a charge of constructive possession of drugs by circumstan-
tial evidence.' 2 The Ellis court reversed the denial of the motion
and acknowledged that the issue of constructive possession is nor-
mally a jury question. In this case, however, it held that a jury
could not have reasonably decided that the accused had construc-
tive possession of the drugs. 2 In State v. Oswald,'2 8 the First Dis-
trict similarly decided that the state had not proved a prima facie
case of constructive possession based upon circumstantial evi-
dence. The Fourth District reached this result in Camp v. State29
and the Third District, in Kuhn v. State, 30 also decided a con-
structive possession case pursuant to a (c)(4) motion.
Despite these cases, most courts have held that constructive pos-
session is an improper issue to be resolved in a (c)(4) motion' 3 '
because the trier of fact must infer knowledge from the surround-
ing facts and circumstances. 32 The state must prove (1) knowledge
of the presence of the contraband; (2) knowledge of the illicit na-
ture of the contraband; and (3) the ability to maintain control and
exercise dominion over the contraband. 33 This knowledge is usu-
122. 333 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).
123. Id.
124. 363 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
125. State v. Mattox, 441 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
126. 346 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
127. Id. at 1047.
128. 442 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
129. 293 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 302 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1974).
130. 439 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).
131. E.g., State v. Mattox, 441 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); State v. Radandt, 410 So.
2d 665 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); State v. Alford, 395 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); State v.
Savarino, 381 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
132. State v. Craig, 413 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
133. See, e.g., Kuhn v. State, 439 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Hively v. State, 336 So.
2d 127 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).
1985]
272 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:257
ally not susceptible to direct proof; therefore, a trial judge usually
cannot decide the issue as a matter of law. Rather, the trier of fact
must decide whether the accused had knowledge of the contra-
band. The Fourth District has decided that knowledge is an "ulti-
mate fact question. ' 13 4 Perjury is perhaps the most significant rea-
son for this rule; courts have reacted negatively to obvious self-
serving statements of lack of knowledge in (c)(4) motions.135 The
question of knowledge of the possession of stolen property is also
an improper issue for (c)(4) motions. 3 ' Self-serving explanations of
possession of stolen property are not dispositive because the trial
judge need not believe the defendant's explanation. 137
The district courts of appeal have treated the issue of intent in a
similar fashion.138 The trier of fact must infer intent, like knowl-
edge, from the surrounding facts and circumstances. The Fourth
District formulated the rule in State v. West:"3 9
[I]ntent is usually a question of fact to be determined by the trier
of fact. The trier of fact has the opportunity to observe the wit-
nesses. From that observation, the trier of fact may determine the
believability of that witness and the weight to be given his testi-
mony. The demeanor of the witness, his frankness,. . . his intelli-
gence, his interest in the outcome of the case, and the reasonable-
ness of'the testimony presented, in light of all of the evidence
..are but a few of those factors which may play a part.1 40
Most courts have probably considered intent as an "ultimate fact"
question because a trial judge cannot determine factual issues on
summary judgment nor consider the weight of conflicting evidence
or determine credibility.
In murder cases, all courts have rejected the resolution of the
intent issue in (c)(4) motions.1 41 The accused is often the only wit-
ness to the murder. Consequently, the state can attempt to prove
intent from the circumstances of the murder itself. Self-serving
134. Alford, 395 So. 2d at 202.
135. See, e.g., State v. Farrugia, 419 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); State v. Pastorius,
419 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Wale v. State, 397 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
136. Ridley v. State, 407 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); State v. Carroll, 404 So. 2d
844 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
137. Ridley, 407 So. 2d at 1000; Carroll, 404 So. 2d at 844.
138. See, e.g., Farrugia, 419 So. 2d 1118; State v. Oxx, 417 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 5th DCA
1982).
139. 262 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972).
140. Id. at 458.
141. See, e.g., State v. Alexander, 406 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
MOTION TO DISMISS
declarations of lack of intent (or claim of accident or other affirma-
tive defenses) have not been accepted by reviewing courts.142
The rule against deciding intent or state of mind in the context
of a (c) (4) motion is not absolute. A trial judge can decide the
question of intent pursuant to a (c)(4) motion if the facts do not
lead to any reasonable inference of unlawful intent. Examples of
such decisions include: a case involving an aggravated battery in an
automobile accident where the state alleged only general intent in
the information;'4" a case of a stepmother who discussed soliciting
a "hit man" to maim her stepson at some unknown future time;
14 4
and a case of possession of common household items which re-
sulted in a charge of possession of burglary tools.145 These cases
indicate that a (c)(4) motion can be a proper vehicle for deciding
the issue of intent. An inflexible rule against deciding intent or
state of mind belittles the purpose of Rule 3.190(c)(4). Although
the trier of fact must usually infer intent or state of mind from the
circumstances, these inferences must still be reasonable.1 46 A trial
judge should be able to determine, as a matter of law, whether a
reasonable jury could make rational inferences demonstrating un-
lawful intent from a set of undisputed facts. If there are any possi-
ble logical and rational inferences of unlawful intent, the court
should deny the motion. This posture would eliminate the in-
stances of self-serving declarations of lack of intent or knowledge.
However, if the undisputed facts do not give rise to any rational
inferences of intent, judicial economy requires a judge to grant the
(c)(4) motion.
The Florida Supreme Court recently considered the propriety of
deciding in a (c)(4) motion a defense based upon prosecutorial mis-
conduct in violation of the defendant's constitutional right to due
process.' 47 In State v. Glosson, the defense and the state stipulated
to the following facts: (1) Glosson raised an entrapment defense;
142. State v. Stewart, 404 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); State v. McCray, 387 So. 2d
559 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
143. State v. Shorette, 404 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).
144. State v. Gaines, 431 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).
145. Preston v. State, 373 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 383 So. 2d 1203
(Fla. 1980).
146. State v. Fuller, 463 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). The Fuller decision is a rare
example of a court's discussing the reasonableness of the inferences from the undisputed
facts. See also Mayo v. State, 71 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1954); Woods v. State, 426 So. 2d 69 (Fla.
1st DCA 1983); Tillman v. State, 353 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
147. State v. Glosson, 462 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1985), aff'g 441 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1st DCA
1983).
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(2) Wilson, a vital witness for the state, had an oral agreement
with the sheriff to receive 10% of all the income from the civil
forfeiture proceedings resulting from criminal investigations of
Glosson and others; (3) the state attorney knew of and supervised
Wilson's investigations; and (4) the state also knew of the contin-
gent fee paid from the civil forfeiture funds, and that Wilson was
obliged to testify and cooperate in the criminal prosecutions result-
ing from his investigations in order to collect his contingent fees.
After finding that the defendant's right to due process had been
infringed by prosecutorial misconduct, the information was dis-
missed by the trial court.1 48 The district court affirmed the dismis-
sal because the issue of the denial of the defendant's due process
right was one of law which the trial judge could decide in a (c)(4)
motion. The supreme court affirmed the First District because the
due process issue of the contingent fee in exchange for prosecution
testimony did not involve issues of credibility for the jury. Justice
McDonald opined that the due process defense of governmental
misconduct is an objective test, as opposed to the subjective pre-
disposition defense submitted to a jury in the usual entrapment
case. Also, the state agreed to a pretrial disposition of the issue to
avoid a possible adverse ruling after a long trial. Consequently, the
state could not claim procedural error following a ruling it invited
the trial court to make.
In Cruz v. State,49 a case involving the "drunken wino" decoy
entrapment defense, the supreme court has recently held that the
issue of predisposition in an entrapment case is always for the jury.
However, the new threshold objective test for the propriety of po-
lice conduct developed by the court in Cruz is still appropriate for
a (c)(4) motion.
IV. CONCLUSION
The use of Rule 3.190(c)(4) motions began in the early 1970's
with the hope that courts could avoid unnecessary and costly tri-
als. Initially, courts viewed the (c)(4) motion as the ideal context
for deciding legal issues when the facts were not in dispute. Misuse
of Rule 3.190(c)(4) soon led courts to develop restrictive rules
about (c)(4) motions. At the present time, Florida appellate courts
have restricted the use of (c)(4) motions to a narrow range of cases.
Like most legal principles, exceptions exist to the general hostile
148. 462 So. 2d at 1083.
149. 465 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 1985).
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view of (c)(4) motions. Attorneys and courts who are familiar with
these exceptions can successfully litigate legal issues in (c)(4) mo-
tions and avoid costly and time-consuming trials.

